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ABSTRACT
Darwin's Origin launched evolution into theoretical orbit and it continues to influence its course. 
This magnum opus detailed a tenable solution to the most fundamental problem of human existence, 
and although this  Promethean vision contains  a  few minor errors, there is  one nontrivial  error 
which misguides several crucial developments – not only in the evolving structure of evolutionary 
theory, but across the entire spectrum of science, including politico-economics.  This problem has 
led  theorists  to  mistakenly  favour  earth-based  inputs  over  cosmic  inputs,  to  over-emphasize 
biological evolution, and to under-emphasize stellar evolution.  These perceptive, methodological, 
and  logical  errors  have, in  turn, emphasized  the  significance  of  the  individual “struggle  against 
competitors” over the  cooperative “struggle against inclement environments”, and thus fashionable 
theories relating to Global Warming,  The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, and The Tragedy of  
the Commons have been erected upon false and sandy foundations and suggest evolutionarily unstable 
solutions.  And to this point, in light of the discoveries presented here, we conclude that largely 
redirected  global  threat  mitigation  efforts  will  require  unprecedented  levels  of  international 
cooperation if long-term human survival is to be achieved.
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§1.  INTRODUCTION
On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of the Favoured Nations in the  
Struggle for Life (1) was published 150 years ago, on November 24th of 1859, and – with De Re  
Militari (2), On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres (3), Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (4), 
A Treatise of Human Nature (5), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (6), Common 
Sense (7),  An Essay on the Principle of Population (8), Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (9), Personal  
Narrative (10), Cosmos (11), On the Law which has Regulated The Introduction of New Species (12), The  
Gettysburg Address (cf 13), A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field (14), Sailing Alone Around the  
World (15),£ ten Annalen der Physik briefs (16-25), The Winning of the West (26), The Economic  
Consequences of the Peace (27), Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (28), The Second World War (29) 
Non-Cooperative Games (30), The Logic of Scientific Discovery (31), Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids 
(32), Island Biology (33), The Pretense of Knowledge (34), The Constitution of Liberty (35), The Mustique Co. 
Development Plan of 1968 (cf 36), a 1985 letter to Nature (37), a 1987 interview in Woman's Own (38), 
The Process and Progress of Economics (39), Evolution and the Theory of Games (40), The Structure of  
Evolutionary Theory (41),  What Makes Biology Unique (42), War and Peace (43), a secret message (44), 
and Failure is Not an Option (45)$ – glimmers amongst our most brilliant illuminations, most valuable 
problem-solving tools, and most informative sources for long-term human survival strategies.
     As a Fellow of the biological society (46 ; cf 36 ) where Darwin and Wallace devoted much of 
their efforts and announced their revolutionary discovery (47 ; cf 48), it may come of little surprise 
that I hold the Origin in high regard (cf 36).  Furthermore, I concur that the Origin
exceeds all other scientific ‘classics’ of past centuries in immediate and continued relevance to 
the  basic  theoretical  formulation  and  debates  of  current  practitioners.  Careful  exegesis  of 
Darwin’s logic and intentions, through textual analysis of the Origin, therefore assumes unusual 
importance for the contemporary practice of science (41, p 58).
     Which is exactly why it is so critical that I must presently bring the grave nature of the Origin's 
most significant error to light.  This task would not be so difficult if it were not for the fact that so 
much that has “been so thoroughly muddled by Plato and Aristotle, whose influence has given rise to 
such deep-rooted prejudices that the prospect of dispelling them does not seem very bright” (49, 
vol II, p 9), but I will try.
£ Joshua Slocum was the first man to sail around the world in a small boat with none but himself as captain, mate and 
crew.  Other men may repeat the feat.  No other man can be the first….  He wrote of his ship and his voyage, and it 
never occurred to him that in doing so he was forging a bond between the English whose blood was in his veins and the 
Americans under whose flag he was proud to circumnavigate the world….
    Captain Slocum was born in Nova Scotia in 1844....  He was eight years old when his family moved to Briar’s Island 
and he left school and was put to work on the farm.  At the age of twelve he was caught making a ship model in the 
cellar where he should have been grading potatoes, was given a beating, saw his model smashed and ran away from 
home.  For the next few years he earned a living for himself, as cook, ship’s boy and what not, among the fishermen on 
the Bay of Fundy.  At the age of sixteen he and a friend sailed before the mast in a full-rigged ship from St. John’s [sic], 
New Brunswick, to Dublin.  We next hear of him as an ordinary seaman in a British ship, sailing from England to China. 
He went down with fever and was left in a hospital at Batavia.  There he made a very good friend in Captain Airy of the  
S.S. Soushay.  He left Batavia in the Soushay, and in that vessel voyaged at many far-eastern ports.  He can have lost no 
opportunity of educating himself, for at eighteen he was promoted to second mate.  He twice rounded the Horn in 
British ships (15, pp 21-22).
$ We had not anticipated what happened back then, on Earth....  In fact, it would be hours before we really understood 
what had happened....  [But] what we could not accomplish through technology, or procedures and operating manuals, 
we might be able to manage by drawing on a priceless fund of experience, accumulated over almost a decade of sending  
men into places far beyond the envelope of Earth's protective, nurturing atmosphere....  These three astronauts were 
beyond our physical reach.  But not beyond the reach of human imagination, inventiveness, and a creed that we all lived 
by:  'Failure is not an option' (45, p 12).
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      And it seems this effort must include rough sketches of three intellectual obstacles which 
effectively block the doorway to these illusive truths.  Presently, we'll merely consider the most 
menacing gargoyle: teleology.
     Several methodological issues make it rather difficult to ascertain how little or much to say about 
this big problem, so I will merely offer a brief definition [“any processes that ‘persist toward an end 
point under varying conditions’ or in which ‘the end state of the process is determined by its 
properties at the beginning’” (42, p 49)], refer the curious to a more thorough contextualization 
(cf 42, pp 39- 41), and restrict focus to aspects most relevant to the problem at hand:
Natural  selection  does  not  guarantee  the  power  of  adaptation  in  all  circumstances,  and  if 
environments change rapidly and profoundly enough, these alterations may exceed the power of 
adaptation by natural selection, with extinction of most forms as the expected result, even in the 
most strictly Darwinian of circumstances...
    Darwin’s hostility to catastrophic mass extinction does not arise primarily from threats posed 
to the mechanism of natural selection itself, but more from the challenges raised by the prospect 
of sudden global change to the key… assumption that observable processes at work in modern 
populations  can,  given  the  amplitude  of  geological  time,  render  the  full  panoply  of 
macroevolutionary results by prolonged accretion and accumulation.
     The problem of mass extinction became acute for Darwin because geological  paroxysm 
threatened  something  quite  particular,  vitally  important,  and  therefore  of  much  greater 
immediate pith and moment than his general methodological preference for locating all causality 
in  the  palpable  observation  of  microevolution…  Global  catastrophe  could  undermine  the 
ecological  argument  that  Darwin  had  so  carefully  devised…  to  validate  something  more 
particular but no less important: his culture’s central belief in progress...
     To explain the general pattern of life’s history, Darwin sought to extrapolate the results of 
competition  ordained  by  the  immediacies  of  natural  selection  in  ecological  moments.   In 
particular…, to argue that most competition, in a world chock full of species, unfolds in the 
biotic mode of direct battle for limited resources, mano a mano so to speak, and not in the abiotic 
mode of struggle to survive in difficult physical conditions. If struggle by... battle (which favors 
mental and biomechanical improvement) trumps struggle against inclement environment (which 
often favors cooperation rather than battle…), then a broad vector of progress should pervade 
the history of life (41, pp 1298-1299).
     But of course the fossil record has clearly demonstrated that this is not the case; and thus 
Darwin’s need to cater to the teleological worldview of the Victorian era has generated grave and, 
alas, very long-lasting consequences.  
     This seemingly minor flaw in this magnificent foundational work has spawned grave and 
unintended consequences, namely, the gross underestimation of the global, national, and familial 
threats presented by cosmic (and a few planetary) inputs.  Perhaps most significantly, it has almost 
completely obscured our dire need for cooperation (planetary threat mitigation efforts) at the global 
level.  
     These crucial points were recently synthesized,unified, and contextualize in a brief 
communiqué (50) and then sailed the Gulf Stream in a rather long message-in-a-bottle (36),
but as the exposition of the entire group of considerations would be rather difficult to follow, 
only a few quite elementary reflexions will be given in the following pages, from which the 
reader will readily be able to inform himself as to the suppositions of the theory and its line of 
thought (24, p 898).
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§2.  ON DARWIN'S NONTRIVIAL ERROR
The 150th anniversary of the Origin and the 200th celebration of Darwin's birth have generated both 
praise and critical reassessments of Darwin's works and methodology.  To date, criticisms appear to 
have largely recounted trivial errors (e.g., 51).
     However, in order “to enhance the implausibility of truly catastrophic mass dying, Darwin holds 
that ‘the complete extinction of the species of a group is generally a slower process than their 
production” (1, p 318, as cited in 41, p 1300).  Darwin confessed, “Scarcely any... discovery is more 
striking than the fact, that the forms of life change almost simultaneously throughout the world” (1, 
p 322). And in pages 317-318 he had falsely concluded that
this impression must be an artefact produced by the markedly incomplete preservation of more 
gradual and continuous change in a woefully imperfect geological record... ‘The old notion of all 
the inhabitants of the earth having been swept away at successive periods by catastrophes is very 
generally given up, even by those geologists… whose general views would naturally lead them to 
this conclusion. On the contrary, we have every reason to believe, from the study of the tertiary 
formations, that species and groups of species gradually disappear, one after the other, first from 
one spot, then from another, and finally from the world.’ (1, p 302, as cited in 41, p 1301).
     This nontrivial error leaves us increasingly vulnerable to mass extinction by continuing to 
misguide science and pop-culture alike:
In particular, these… assumptions about the extended duration of apparent mass extinctions led 
geologists and palaeontologists to favour earth-based rather than cosmic physical inputs…, and 
to focus upon telluric influences (like changing climates and sea levels) that could most easily be 
rendered as gradualistic in style. So strongly entrenched did this prejudice remain, even spilling 
over into popular culture as well, that a few years after Alvarez et al.  published their plausible, 
and  by then  increasingly  well  affirmed, scenario  of  extraterrestrial  impact  as  a  catastrophic 
trigger for the Cretaceous-Tertiary  event, the  New York Times even ridiculed the idea in  their 
editorial pages, proclaiming… that ‘terrestrial events, like volcanic activity or changes in climate 
or sea level, are the most immediate possible cause of mass extinctions. Astronomers should 
leave to astrologers the task of seeking the cause of earthly events in the stars’ (41, p 1303).
     If the problem at hand is not clear by now, please consider an extraordinary new book: 
The Cosmic Connection:  How Astronomical Events Impact Life on Earth (52):
Our ascendancy as a species is usually credited to Darwinian processes, such as passing along 
traits from one generation to the next, genetic mutations that improve an organism's chances of 
survival, successful  adaptations  of  organisms  to  different  regions  or  environments, and  the 
flourishing of  one species  of  another.  Nevertheless, evolution is  not enough to  explain  the 
ascension of the human race on this amazing planet. In its most sweeping terms, life also results 
from conditions not of our world but of our universe (52, p 10).
     Indeed, social and biological sciences place undue emphasis upon very recent events – the social 
sciences find a great deal of significant data in the past few centuries, and the biological sciences find 
a great deal of significant data over evolutionary time, but, in reality, the Earth has experienced 
almost no significant cosmic events (and thus we find almost no truly useful data) in the course of 
Hominid evolution.  
     For example the  “asteroid the size of Mount Everest” (52, p 12) that splashed down along the 
coast of the Yucatán peninsula, resulting in the complete extinction of 70% of terrestrial life 
(including 100% of the dinosaurs) and 96% of all marine life, does, to be certain, represent one of 
the most significant events in natural history and therefore one of the most valuable pieces data on 
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Earth – but neither economics, contemporary theorists, politicians, nations, nor popular culture are 
much concerned with this 'outlier'.  And, once again, this is problematic, to say the least because
knowing how astronomical influences have shaped our world and enabled the human race to 
evolve and flourish gives us a unique perspective on the nature and direction of life on Earth and 
the possibility of life on other planets (52, p 13).
     “Mass extinctions are more frequent, more rapid, more intense, and more different in their 
effects than... Darwinian biology could permit” (41, p 1312-1313), and this has had profound effects 
upon all sciences and politico-economic development strategies.  To paraphrase J.B.S. Haldane (53), 
one does not have to be a profound realist to realise that consistently underestimating the 
probability of mass extinction finds favour with those clinging to teleological comforts, and creates 
serious problems for those who endeavour to develop and deploy evolutionarily stable strategies.
     And to make matters worse, those able-minded theorists who possess the courage and take the 
time to patiently offer these unfashionable perspectives are invariably ignored or ridiculed.  One 
such individual, Milutin Milankovitch, quietly pointed out that the Earth's axis is not fixed, but 
rather oscillates over a 41,000 year cycle, an oscillation which appears to have been (and continues to 
be) the greatest long-term influence of climate change (52).  And, like many misunderstood 
visionaries, “Milankovitch was certainly on to something when practically everyone else thought he 
was not” (52, p 38).
     How was it that he was able to see something so clearly which so many others could not?  By simply 
adopting the universal worldview necessary to grasp the discovery illuminated here:
Milankovitch did not merely see the Earth and its sediments; he saw the Earth in space and in 
motion around the Sun over the course of millions of years.  It took uncanny vision to step off 
the Earth and look back from a distance of 100 million miles and watch cogs turn, then forge a... 
connection... It was the same kind of vision possessed by people like Agassiz, Adhemar, Croll, 
and Wegener, some of whom paid a high price to see worlds, possibilities, and connections that 
others could, or would, not (52, p 28).
     Although it is true that “nothing makes sense in biology except in the light of evolution” (54, p 
449), that nothing on Earth (or elsewhere in the universe) makes sense except in the light of galactic, 
stellar, and planetary evolution is a more significant truth:
Look anywhere beyond our little nook of Galaxy and you will see a universe that is not only 
dispassionate, but dangerous and random.  Comets plough into planets.  Stars explode without 
regard to what clinging forms of life may be in the vicinity.  Black holes suck up space and time 
at will (52, p 63).
     At least one writer (55) has suggested we will never accomplish interstellar travel; but as an 
optimistic£ problem-solver focused upon human survival, your author has hope that where there is a 
will, there is a way.
     Furthermore, in essence, this pessimistic prophecy has already been falsified: we have, essentially, 
been travelling in such a manner for the past ≈13 billion years:  Our planet – along with the rest of our 
solar system – is speeding through interstellar space at 12 miles per second “in the direction of the 
constellation Hercules, southwest of the bright star Vega and just north of the billowy clouds of the 
summer Milky Way” (52, p 162).
£ Yes, despite all this I remain an optimist toward the world.  It is one’s duty to be an optimist.  Only from this point of 
view can one be active and do what one can.  If you are a pessimist, you have given up.  We must remain optimists, we 
have to look at the world from the point of view of how beautiful it is, and to try to do what we can to make it better 
(56, p 48).
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§3.  DISCUSSION
What logical implications follow from these profound and illusive truths?   What are the implications for the  
advancement of science?  National security?  International Cooperation?  Human survival?
     In general, we may wish to start thinking more clearly about the road ahead, being mindful of 
obstacles we may wish to try to avoid or prepare to meet.
     But this would require – amongst a myriad of inter-connected issues – the complete recognition 
and wide adoption of Sir Karl Popper's remarkable solution (31) to David Hume's Problem of  
Induction (5).  I've written on this  topic at length (e.g., 50 ; 36 ; 13) and brilliant thinkers from 
Hayek (34-35) to Hawking (57) have testified as well, but there's little to indicate we're willing to 
relinquish our “intense desire for assured knowledge” (58, p 22) and teleological fairytales; it seems 
our disdain for realism and affection for the Pretense of Knowledge (34) remains so strong that we'd 
rather be Fooled by Randomness (59) and commit ourselves to near-certain extinction than face these 
difficult and disquieting truths (extinction would remain a high probability even if we were thinking 
clearly, strategizing, and acting accordingly).  Clear thinking about this problem would also require 
the wide recognition of a key deduction by a gifted problem-solver “regularly credited with being 
one of the two most important logicians of the twentieth century” (60):  Economic power is 
derivative, not primary (61 ; cf 13, 2, 6, 26, 29, 44). 
     But, like the perverse effect of the welfare state (62), this is yet another unfashionable truth 
which most would prefer not to acknowledge.  Indeed, the inter-related problems which stem from 
Darwin's Nontrivial Error are incredibly far-reaching, yet we must confine ourselves to brief 
examples.  Consider, for example, that growing legions of ideological environmentalists and an 
entire ‘school’ of economics (so-called ‘ecological economics’) have failed to recognize the existence, 
much less the significance, of cosmic inputs.  In fact, a very heavy game-theoretical wrecking-ball 
(50) topples so many widely-held and wildly popular theories (e.g., 63-64) that it will likely face 
fierce resistance,£ and, as Edward De Bono once conjectured, it is possible that these unfashionable 
ideas “can only be expressed in book form” (65, p 31); thus, Fortune willing, a very big book with a 
very simple, straight-forward message – one long argument – is on the way (cf 36, pp 66-68).  
     But for now let's consider the manner in which theoretical wrecking-ball (50) falsifies the central 
thesis of ‘ecological economics’ (and hip-checks ideological environmentalism to the boards) – a 
refutation which is quite unnecessary – for it is quite unnecessary to falsify a ‘subject’ which does 
not exist (cf 36, pp 80 -81), yet some readers may insist.
     So, consider the flimsy central thesis, as postulated by Herman E. Daly:
The facts are plain and uncontestable: the biosphere is finite, nongrowing, closed  (except for the 
constant input of solar energy), and constrained by the laws of thermodynamics. Any subsystem, 
such  as  the  economy,  must  at  some  point  cease  growing  and  adapt  itself  to  a  dynamic 
equilibrium, something like a steady state (66, p 101).
     But are the facts plain and uncontestable?
     Is the biosphere closed?  
     Is solar energy a constant input? (cf 52).  
     Is solar energy the sole ‘cosmic input’ to consider? 
£ I suppose the process of acceptance will pass through the usual four stages:
      1.  This is worthless nonsense,
      2.  This is an interesting, but perverse, point of view,
      3.  This is true, but quite unimportant,
      4.  I always said so (53, p 464).
6 of 13
Proceedings of the Linnean Society of London Brian G. Gardiner, Editor
     I’m afraid school is officially in session for Professor Daly and his fashionable friends because the 
existence of a wide variety of cosmic and planetary inputs illuminates the false foundation upon 
which the central thesis of ecological economics is lightly tethered (50).  Alas, the Earth has not, nor 
ever will be in a steady state, as the problem of induction renders this state indeterminable (31 ; 50).
     But problems associated with the errors at hand are certainly not limited to this popular branch 
of economics.  In fact, sampling the most influential scientific journals (67) at random testifies to 
near-universal error.  For example, a review of Science's 'top articles of last month' reveals that, yet-
again, Garret Hardin's 1968 Tragedy of the Commons (68) remains at the top, and very little literature 
review is required to conclude that this paper remains amongst the most influential papers in 
science.  However, setting aside the fact that the citation itself, “Hardin 1968” (68) is incorrect (69), 
logical implications which follow from the truths presented here falsify this highly influential theory; 
although this discourse is restricted to elementary reflexions, exhaustive indirect proofs (50 ; 36) 
and On the Travesty of the Tragedy of the Commons: Hardin's Nontrivial Error (69) clarify this conjecture; 
further reflexions on this refutation yield a bountiful harvest of related revelations, including the 
falsification of the findings of a 2009 Sveriges Riksbank Prize winner.  Although detailed considerations 
remain outside the scope of this discourse, a review of collected works (70-80) reveals systemic 
errors, faulty perceptions, and false conclusions.  And this is, in large part, due to the fact that these 
faulty perceptions and methodological errors are the norm, not the exception:
When we look at the world around us we see (if we are attentive enough) what is actually there, 
even if what is actually there is not the same as what we expected to see there. When we turn 
our attention from the world around us to the world of possibilities that we can imagine with 
our minds, however, perception does not work nearly so well.  We often fail to see the obvious 
until it is too late or until somebody else sees it and points it out to us. And very often something 
that we think is the case is not the case at all (81, p xiii).
     Ostrom's potpourri of apocrypha (70-80) were derived through the inductive analysis of data 
relating to incomplete perceptions of various 'commons' problems around the world£ and inherently 
flawed by an inability to imagine the serious possibilities presented by cosmic inputs.  But, to be fair, 
our prizewinner is certainly not alone, it seems the implications which follow from this problem 
remain largely unknown to all but your author. 
     Indeed, the fashionable empirical methods in economics invariably leave us with little more than 
legerdemain (i.e., 63-64 ; 66 ; 68 ; 70-80), and these errors remain wholly uncorrected (e.g., 82):
We have... depended on analysis not only to solve problems but also for our source of new ideas. 
Most people in education, science, business and economics still believe that the analysis of data 
will give us all the new ideas that we need. Unfortunately, this is not so. The mind can see only 
what it is prepared to see. That is why after a breakthrough in science we look back and find that 
all the needed evidence was available a long time before but could be seen only through the old 
idea (65, p 23).
£ Ostrom... has challenged the conventional wisdom that common property is poorly managed and should be completely 
privatized or regulated by central authorities.  Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks, pastures, woods, 
lakes, and  groundwater  basins, Ostrom concluded  that  the  outcomes  are  often  better  than  predicted  by  standard 
theories.  The perspective of these theories was too static to capture the sophisticated institutions for decisionmaking 
and rule enforcement that have emerged to handle conflicts of interest in user-managed common pools around the 
world.  By turning to more recent theories that take dynamics into account, Ostrom found that some of the observed 
institutions could be well understood as equilibrium outcomes of repeated games.  However, other rules and types of 
behavior  are  difficult  to  reconcile  with  this  theory, at  least  under  the  common assumption that  players  are  selfish 
materialists  who  only  punish  others  when  it  is  their  own  interest.  In  field  studies  and  laboratory  experiments 
individuals’ willingness to punish defectors appears greater than predicted by such a model (82, pp 1-2).
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     Indeed, almost all of the truths presented here were known to us prior to the publication of 
Darwin's Origin in November of 1859 (1), but alas, this is the process and progress of science (39).
      Why is the process and progress so slow and misguided?  This is, alas, a long and sad story (34), 
because, once again, things have “been so thoroughly muddled by Plato and Aristotle” (49, p 9). 
And, as previously noted, we find very, very little useful empirical data on Earth.  Refer back to the 
footnote on the previous page, note that Ostrom's researches are “based on numerous studies”. 
Note how many times the Swedish Royal Academy has referred to her “observations”.  Or better yet, 
consider spending a few moments listening to Ostrom infer validity for her findings by rattling-off 
the numbers of her studies which support her untenable conjectures (83).  An excerpt from some 
recent correspondence may help contextualize this important point:
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Nontrivial indeed
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2009
From: Jeff Kanipe
To: Matt Funk, FLS
Hello Matt,
     I must say I'm very impressed by your paper on Darwin's nontrivial error.  Will this eventually 
be published?  I certainly hope so, as you raise some fascinating points that I'm sure would spur 
further discussion.
      I especially appreciate your generous direct reference to my book [52] in the text....
     What was interesting for me was to see how you applied my points to yours, although they 
are ones that I'm embarrassed to say I didn't fully consider at the time!  It leaves me feeling I 
accomplished something greater than what I first set out to do!
     For example, Gould's statement on page [3], concerning how competition in a world teeming 
with species unfolds in one of two ways, either as a 'struggle by battle' or a 'struggle against an 
inclement  environment,'  made  me  reflect  back  to  my  chapter  on  asteroids  and  asteroid 
mitigation...; [and]...  Gould's remarks, coupled with the two points you make in the following 
paragraph, clearly indicate that civilization is facing an imminent crossroads at which we either 
choose  the  path  of  global  cooperation  and  the  hope  for  continued  existence, or  stick  with 
Darwinian processes and risk not surviving as a species....
     Said another way, if we are to survive as a species-as Earthlings-we must now take the high 
road, whereby we cooperatively struggle against the 'inclement environment' of our planet in 
space, rather than just localized inclement environments on Earth.  Natural selection,  per se, 
takes a back seat to global extinction events; in fact, it may not even be in the car (84).
     Yes, Kanipe is quite right, Natural selection may not even be on the same roadway.  Furthermore 
– and to this salient point – outside of pure physics, empiricism invariably takes back seat to pure 
theory.  For example, consider one of the most brilliant illuminations, most valuable problem-
solving tools, and most informative sources for long-term human survival strategies noted in §1:
In  the  last  of  his  1905 papers, entitled  On the  Electrodynamics  of  Moving  Bodies  [19], Einstein 
presented what became known as the special theory of relativity.  The paper reads more like an 
essay than a scientific communication.  Entirely theoretical, it contains no notes or bibliographic 
citations.  Einstein wrote this 9,000-word treatise in just five weeks, yet historians of science 
consider it every bit as comprehensive and revolutionary as Isaac Newton's Principia [4] (85).
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     Alas, however, not only does the thoroughly embarrassing academic infatuation with history 
invariably put empiricism in the front of the car – it puts it in the driver's seat.£  And the Poverty of  
Historicism (86), which happens to be inextricably intertwined with that menace known as teleology, 
is an impoverished and depauperated state which no species can survive for long.  It may be 
interesting to speculate how many journals would pass on publication of On the Electrodynamics of  
Moving Bodies (19) today.  Afterall, the Swedish Academy did not have confidence in this essay, thus 
they awarded Einstein the 1921 prize in physics for a much less significant contribution (18 ; cf 85).
     Yes, our planet is a precious resource which we must endeavour to protect – but it is also a 
depreciating asset which we must eagerly and voraciously consume in order to survive, and, in light of 
cosmology and the problem of induction (50), we must assume a depreciation schedule of ≈50,000 
years.  In brief, our struggle to protect this asset must be balanced with a recognition that we have 
rightly been consuming (and must continue to consume) this resource in our resource-intensive 
quests for threat mitigation technologies (fission, fusion, spacecraft, weapons, telescopes, asteroid 
tugboats, alternative food sources, deep underground/undersea human habitats, etc.) to help extend 
the shelf-life of the Earth and the life-span of the human species, and, moreover, to ultimately 
facilitate our search for another world (ultra long-distance dispersal, cf 50 ; 87).  
     This new concept – ultra-long distance dispersal (ULDD) – happens to represent another 
intellectual obstacle which threatens to thwart our efforts here because, to date, it has not been 
recognized as the ultimate measurement of Darwinian fitness.  Although Hawking champions ULDD 
(87), few others second this motion.  This may in part be due to the fact that, given Darwin's Error, 
with the notable exception of a few key revolutionary insights (cf 33 ; 88-90), contemporary 
evolutionary theorists have also largely failed to recognized the crucial role long-distance and inter-
continental dispersal have played in human evolution (i.e., getting “Out of Africa”).  But a  brief 
thought experiment reveals that, reductio ad adsurdum, ULDD, is the ultimate measure of  fitness, 
because, eventually, resource holding power (40) will ultimately be determined by ULDD.
     And this lamentable failure to recognize the unity of nature brings us to a brief reflexion on the 
third obstacle which threatens to obliterate our truly inconvenient truth  from the light of day: the 
manifold and intrenched problems associated with specialization:
The specialization of science is an inevitable accompaniment of progress; yet it is full of dangers, 
and it is cruelly wasteful, since so much that is beautiful and enlightening is cut off from most of 
the world.  Thus it is proper to the role of the scientist that he not merely find new truths and 
communicate it  to  his  fellows, but that  he teach, that  he  try  to bring the most  honest  and 
intelligible account of new knowledge to all who will  try to learn (91, pp 138-139 ; cf 50).
     And thus we have reached the crux of this difficult climb.  Oppenheimer estimated that scientists 
may make up about “one one-hundredth of a percent” of the human population (91, p 94), and, to 
make matters worse, as  Dawkins often notes, many scientists think they understand evolutionary 
theory – yet it seems very few truly do. 
     Furthermore, previous commitments (religious commitments), stir many able-minded scientists 
to reject evolutionary theory outright, and, just when it seems the intellectual climate could be no 
worse, it turns out a 150 year-old nontrivial error in the foundational base of evolutionary theory 
has generated countless and unquantifiable errors throughout the scientific and political worlds.
£ There is an obsession with history.  History is there and increasing in quantity, both because we are learning more about 
it and because we create it every day.  We can get the 'teeth' of our minds into it.  History is attractive because it is always 
possible to find a niche and there is always a reward for effort – in contrast to many subjects in which years of endeavour 
may produce nothing.  It is attractive to minds with a preference for analysis...  It may also, sometimes, be a refuge for 
minds that would not achieve much elsewhere (65, p 24).
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We prefer to put our trust  in evolution. This  is  because evolution is  gradual  and allows the 
pressure of needs, values, reactions and events to mould ideas. It allows the shaping force of 
criticism. Bad ideas will die. Good ideas will survive and become even better. We really like the 
method of evolution because it fits our traditional thinking habits.  Change has its own energy 
and we can modify and control this by the use of our critical faculties because criticism is the 
basis of our thinking tradition....
     In spite of these excellent reasons for preferring and trusting evolution, there is a serious flaw 
in... evolutionary [theory] (65, p 19).
     If this communique is intelligible to <.01% of the world, what are our true prospects for 
survival?  99.99% of all species that have ever inhabited the Earth are extinct; the average species 
lifespan is 2 Myr.  How do we communicate the logical implications and profound truths which 
follow from these findings in our fossil record?  How many will grasp that evolutionary stable global 
threat mitigation efforts require a fundamental redirection of contemporary politico-economic 
development strategies and unprecedented levels of international cooperation?  “Studies of mass 
extinctions tend to emphasize the sheer scope of the carnage.  But the subtle differences between 
the species that died and those that survived can be crucial” (92, p 122).   With this thought in mind, 
I will sign off with the closing remark from a talk given at Princeton in 1953:
Research is action; and the question I want to leave in a very raw and uncomfortable form with 
you is  how to communicate this  sense of action to our fellow men who are not destined to 
devote their lives to the professional pursuit of new knowledge (91, p 129).
Mustique, November, 2009£
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